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SUPERVISORY LIABILITY IN
SECTION 1983 CASES1
Kit KMnports
Honorable George C. Pratt:
At this point, we are going to go into the area of supervisory
liability, where we will hear from Professor Kinports from the
University of Illinois law School. We will hear first from her and
then from John Boston. Kit Kinports, you are on.
ProfessorKit Knports:
Thank you. The topic of this presentation is supervisory liability
in Section 19833 cases. Assume for present purposes that a
plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated - that some state
official has acted in violation of the Constitution. The question to
be addressed here is whether that state official's supervisors can be
held liable for damages stemming from the constitutional violation.
Unfortunately, there is not much guidance on the question of
supervisory liability in any of the Supreme Court opinions, or in the
language or legislative history of Section 1983. The language of
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against anyone acting under
color of state law who subjects another person to a constitutional
violation, or who causes that person to be subjected to a
constitutional violation."
Although Section 1983 expressly includes a requirement of
causation - there must be a causal link between the defendant and
the violation of the plaintiffs rights - the language of the statute
' A more complete treatment of this subject is available in Kit Kinports, The
Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability In Section 1983 Cases, 1997
U. ILL. L. REV. 147 (1997).
2 Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
A.B. 1976,
Brown University; J.D. 1980, University of Pennsylvania.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see generally 1A, 1B & 1C MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KnuuLIN, SECTION 1983: CLAMIs AND DEFENSES (3d

ed. 1997).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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seems to envision that a supervisor could be held liable for a
subordinate's constitutional misdeeds.' But the statute does not
point to any particular standard of liability that should be imposed
in those cases. Likewise, Section 1983's legislative history, which
in general is very meager, is silent on the question of the extent to
which supervisors can be held liable for their subordinates'
constitutional misconduct.
There is only one Supreme Court case that directly addresses the
question of when supervisors may be held liable in Section 1983
cases: Rizzo v. Goode, which was decided in 1976. 6 Rizzo v.
Goode involved an injunctive suit against a number of high-ranking
officials in the Philadelphia mayor's office and the Philadelphia
police department.7 The basis of the plaintiff's suit was a series of
improper actions on the part of the Philadelphia police.8
The
plaintiffs won in the district court, and a relatively broad injunction
was issued against the defendants.9 The Supreme Court, clearly
disapproving of that injunction, reversed.10 The Supreme Court's
opinion lists a number of reasons why it disapproved of that
injunction.
Thus, Rizzo is somewhat murky for our purposes given that the
Court gave a number of reasons for reversing the injunction. But
in the portion of the opinion that is relevant to the issue at hand -the portion that dealt with supervisory liability -- the Court

indicated that there must be "an affirmative link" between the
supervisor and the constitutional violation. 1I
Two years following Rizzo, the Supreme Court decided Monell v.
Department of Social Services,'2 the first Supreme Court opinion to
address the standard of liability for cities in Section 1983 cases.
The Monell opinion contains dictum that is relevant for present
purposes. That dictum suggests that when the Court rejected
5 See id.

6 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
7 Id. at 366.

I1d. at 367.
Id. at 365.
°Id. at 380.
"Id. at 371.
12 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

9
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respondeatsuperiorliability for cities - which it did in Monell - it
was also unwilling to impose respondeat superior liability on
supervisors. 3 Specifically, the Court said in Monell that Rizzo,
which had been decided two years earlier, appeared to reject the
argument that Section 1983 liability can be premised on "the mere
right to control without any control or direction having been
exercised and without any failure to supervise."" Those two
opinions from twenty years ago - Rizzo and Moneil - are the only
statements the Supreme Court has made on the question of

supervisory liability. The Court has provided no specific guidelines
as to exactly what sort of "affirmative link" the Rizzo Court was
looking for, or how egregious a "failure to supervise" the Monell

Court thought was necessary to impose liability on supervisors.
Given the lack of guidance from the statute itself, the legislative
history, and the Supreme Court, it is not surprising that the Federal
Courts of Appeals have come up with various standards to impose
in cases involving supervisors. Before focusing on the areas of
disagreement, there are some areas in which the Federal Courts of
Appeals agree. First, they all agree that the "affirmative link"
language from Rizzo is important - that the key is whether or not
the supervisor who is being sued can be said to have had an
affirmative link to the constitutional violation alleged by the
plaintiff.'5 The Courts of Appeals have also uniformly rejected the
two extreme positions on this question. On the one hand, they have
uniformly rejected strict liability - holding supervisors liable on a
respondeatsuperiorbasis for subordinates' constitutional violations,
- and, in addition, they have now all rejected the negligence
standard of liability.
On the other extreme, the courts have uniformly said that
supervisors may be held liable even though they did not directly
participate in the violation, or directly order their subordinates to
violate the Constitution even if they were not present to witness the
particular violation. But between those two extremes, the courts
have come up with three standards of liability for cases involving
'3

Id. at 694 n.58.

14 Id.

' 5 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371.
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supervisors. Before turning to the three standards, it is interesting
to note that there are discrepancies even within some of the Circuits

as to which of the three standards they adopt. Some courts apply
different standards from case to case.
Two predominant standards of liability can be found in the
Federal Courts of Appeals' opinions.

One is a standard of

"recklessness or deliberate indifference." Language can be found
in cases from nine Federal Circuits adopting this standard of
"recklessness
or
deliberate
indifference.""6
The
recklessness/deliberate indifference standard provides that
supervisors are liable if they acted recklessly or with deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The second standard is a "knowledge and acquiescence" standard.
Language can be found in cases from seven Courts of Appeals
adopting that standard .7 Under the knowledge and acquiescence
standard, supervisors are liable if they knew of and acquiesced in

the constitutional violation. It may seem odd that nine Courts of
Appeals have adopted the recklessness/deliberate indifference
standard, and seven have adopted the knowledge and acquiescence
standard. The explanation is that in six Circuits both standards are

being applied in different cases.
The third standard, to the extent it is in effect at all, is applied
only in the Second Circuit. It is the most pro-plaintiff standard --

1

See, e.g., Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.

1994); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 1993);
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Starzenski v. City of
Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277,
280 (8th Cir. 1994); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th
Cir. 1991); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th
Cir. 1993); Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1192
(llth Cir. 1994).
'7 See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir.
1997); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1992); Walton v.
City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995); Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805,
809 (8th Cir. 1994); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th
Cir. 1991); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995).
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gross negligence.18 In Wright v. Smith,19 decided in 1994 - and
actually it goes back before that - the Second Circuit held that
supervisors could be held liable if they were grossly negligent in
managing their subordinates. The Second Circuit has continuously
reaffirmed that gross negligence standard, most recently in Spencer
v. Doe,2' decided earlier this year.
Thus, there are three standards of supervisory liability used in
recklessness or extreme indifference,
Section 1983 cases:
knowledge and acquiescence, and possibly, in the Second Circuit,
gross negligence.
It is fair to ask how these standards differ. If one reads the cases
in which the various courts have applied these standards, it is not
evident that there really is much difference in the outcome of the
cases. That is, it is not clear that the standard the court purports to
be using really makes much difference in terms of how they decide
on the facts of a particular case whether the supervisor is liable for
the employee's constitutional misconduct. As a general matter,
however, the knowledge and acquiescence standard is deemed the
most pro-defendant, the most protective of defendants. The
recklessness/deliberate indifference standard falls in the middle, and
the gross negligence standard is the most pro-plaintiff.
One possible difference between the three standards relates to the
question whether the supervisor must actually have been aware of
the constitutional violation - whether the plaintiff must prove that
the supervisor had actual notice of the problem, or whether the
court is satisfied with evidence of constructive notice. The Federal
Courts of Appeals conflict on that question as well, taking three
different positions.
Some courts have required proof of actual awareness - that the
supervisor was actually aware of the constitutional misconduct. A
middle position that several Courts of Appeals have adopted is a
recklessness standard, requiring only proof that the supervisor was
"SSee, e.g., Black v. Coughlin, 76 F3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing
the term "personal involvement" for Section 1983 purposes to include "gross
negligence" in managing subordinates); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 1994).
19 21 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 1994).
20 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
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aware of a risk that the subordinate was acting in an
unconstitutional way.
Finally, the third and most proplaintiff position, which is the position taken in the Second Circuit,
is that constructive knowledge suffices. If the supervisor should
have been aware of the problem, that is enough to impose liability;
actual notice or even awareness of a risk are not required. Again,
differences can be found in the court opinions within a given
Circuit as to which of those three standards is applied.
It is also interesting to note that the position the courts take on the
notice issue - whether they require actual notice, awareness of a
risk, or constructive notice - is not necessarily tied to the standard
of liability they have imposed, whether they have chosen the
recklessness/deliberate indifference approach or the theoretically
stricter "knowledge and acquiescence" approach. Given this outline
of the legal standards that the courts purport to be applying in
supervisory liability cases, consideration can now be given to the
factors that are used in deciding, on the facts of a particular case,
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from the
supervisor.
There are five factors that the courts tend to agree are relevant in
assessing a supervisor's liability. Those five factors are:
(1) Whether there were any prior incidents similar to the
constitutional violation alleged by the plaintiff;
(2) How adequate the supervisor's response was to those prior
incidents;
(3) How the supervisor responded to the violation alleged by this
particular plaintiff;
(4) To what extent the supervisor can be said to have been a causal
factor in contributing to the constitutional violation; and
(5) To what extent the supervisor was aware of the constitutional
misconduct.
Although there is general agreement about the relevance of those
five factors, the courts come to conflicting results when applying
the factors and determining how much weight they should be given
in particular cases.
Factor One: Prior similar incidents. It is generally true that prior
instances where this particular subordinate acted unconstitutionally - or even where other of the supervisor's subordinates acted in a
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similar manner - help the plaintiff establish that the supervisor met
whatever standard of liability the court is applying. Generally, the
courts have said that if the plaintiff can show only one prior
incident or a series of unrelated prior incidents, that is not enough
to trigger supervisory liability. There must be a stronger pattern of
prior constitutional misconduct by the supervisor's subordinates.
But even where there is evidence of a stronger pattern of prior
violations, the courts come to conflicting results. Despite this
inconsistency in outcomes, this first factor is a very significant
factor in the courts' decisions.
The second factor, which is linked to the first, is how the
supervisor responded to the prior instances of constitutional
misconduct - the adequacy of the remedial steps that were taken.
As a general rule, the courts are much more likely to impose
liability on a supervisor who did not take adequate steps to respond
to previous instances of misconduct. But that is not to say that
ineffective responses necessarily translate into supervisory liability.
There are a substantial number of cases where the courts
acknowledge that the supervisor may not have responded as
completely as she could have, or as effectively as she could have.
Nevertheless, the courts conclude that because the supervisor tried
to do something in response to the prior misconduct, her actions
cannot be deemed constitutionally inadequate. Thus, even an
"ineffective response" is not necessarily a guarantee that a plaintiff
will win a Section 1983 case.
The third factor which some Courts of Appeals, but not all, take
into account is how appropriately the supervisor responded in this
particular case - how adequately the supervisor responded when
this particular plaintiff's rights were violated. But the courts
conflict on the relevance of this third factor. For example, in
Watkins v. City of Oakland, a recent Ninth Circuit case, the court
thought it relevant in imposing liability on the Chief of Police that
he had not responded adequately to the plaintiff's case.21 Not all
courts would agree, however. Some courts take the position that
something that happens after the violation - i.e., the supervisor's
adequate or inadequate response to it - could not have contributed
21 145

F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1998).
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to the subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's rights and therefore
'
is not relevant in assessing the supervisor's liability.
The fourth factor that the courts take into account is the question
of causation - the extent to which the supervisor can be deemed to
be a cause of the constitutional violation suffered by the plaintiff.
Causation issues often arise in supervisory liability cases. The
supervisor often alleges that the causal link required by the
language of Section 1983 is not present because the supervisor is at
least one, and possibly more, steps removed from the subordinate
who actually inflicted the constitutional injury. Often this causation
issue is not discussed as a separate factor, but instead is addressed
in connection with one of the three factors set out above - most
notably, the adequacy of the supervisor's response to prior similar
incidents.
Some courts have indicated that the causal link can be established
by a history of abuse in the past, combined with an inadequate
response on the part of the supervisor. According to these courts,
when state officials learn that they can violate rights without
suffering any consequences, they are encouraged to continue acting
in constitutionally impermissible ways and, therefore, the
supervisor's ineffectual response in the past can be said to have
contributed to the injury suffered by the plaintiff.Y3 In other cases,
however, the courts seem to find that causal link argument too
tenuous. ' But there are at least some courts that are willing to find
the requisite causal link in a situation where the supervisor was on
notice of prior violations and failed to respond adequately.
The fifth and final factor that the courts tend to take into account
in imposing liability on supervisors is the extent to which the
supervisor was aware of the constitutional violation. The greater
the awareness on the part of the supervisor, the more likely the
court is to impose liability. Obviously, this is a crucial factor in
' See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 95 n. ll (ls( Cir.
1994).
23 See, e.g., Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584-85 (1lth Cir.
1995); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539 (1lth Cir. 1993); Stoneking
v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d Cir. 1989).
' See, e.g., Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.
1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 782 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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those Circuits that require proof of awareness in order to impose
liability on a supervisor. But regardless of what standard of
supervisory liability the courts apply, the extent of the supervisor's
awareness is an important factor that they take into account.
Again, just as with issues of causation, some courts do not analyze
the supervisor's awareness as a separate factor, but instead link the
question of awareness to one of the first three factors, most notably,
how appropriately the supervisor responded either to prior similar
incidents or to this particular incident. But "awareness" is an issue
that crops up in a substantial number of supervisory liability cases.
There are two ways in which plaintiffs can try to demonstrate
awareness of the problem on the part of the supervisor: direct
evidence of the supervisor's awareness, and indirect evidence of the
supervisor's awareness.
Direct evidence of the supervisor's
awareness arises in those cases where the supervisor was told about
the problem either by the plaintiff, by other people in the plaintiffs
position, or by the supervisor's subordinates.
One of the leading Second Circuit cases is a case involving direct
evidence of awareness, Wright v. Smith.2Y In that case, the Second
Circuit concluded that the prison superintendent was put on notice
of the constitutional violation suffered by a prisoner because the
prisoner had filed a habeas corpus petition against the
superintendent.Y In this case, direct evidence of awareness came
from the plaintiff himself.
Another interesting case involving direct evidence of a
supervisor's awareness is a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, Smith 1
Brenoettsy.27 In that case, which stemmed from the killing of a
prisoner by a prison guard, the Fifth Circuit denied the warden's
summary judgment motion.2 The warden argued that his failure to
investigate the letters he had received from the prisoner was
objectively reasonable, given that more than six thousand
complaints were filed at the prison each year.Y The Fifth Circuit
21 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 502.
" 158 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 1998).
2Id. at 913.
2'Id. at 912.
2'

2
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disagreed, noting that there was "no authority to support his
argument that the number of prisoner complaints itself makes a
failure to investigate an objectively reasonable response to a specific
complaint."'3 At least at the summary judgment stage, therefore,
the plaintiff prevailed because there was some evidence that the
warden had received notice from the plaintiff about the problem.
The second way that plaintiffs prove awareness on the part of
supervisors is through indirect evidence. Typically this indirect
evidence involves prior similar incidents -- a history of abuse on the
part of the office or the particular state official that was so
widespread that the superior must have been aware of the problem.
In some cases, the courts have used a history of abuse to infer
awareness on the part of a supervisor.
There are cases involving other types of indirect evidence of
awareness, but these are mostly older cases. One such case out of
the Second Circuit is Meriwether v. Coughlin 2 However, since it
was decided in 1989, one should be careful in relying on it. In that
case, the Second Circuit was willing to infer that the supervisor,
once again a prison superintendent, knew or should have known of
the dangers facing the plaintiff prisoners based upon statements his
press secretary had made t6 the press, in addition to statements
found in media reports, and rumors circulating at the prison. 3
Again, however, one can find cases that are factually similar to
those described above, where the courts have been unwilling to find
sufficient evidence of awareness on the part of the supervisor, even
though the plaintiff presented proof that presumably other courts
would have considered adequate? 4
30

1d.

31 See,

e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir.
1990); Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986); Cf. Wilson v.
City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993) (making this argument
vis--vis superintendent of police in context of suit against city), modified on
other grounds, 1993 U.S. App. LExIs 31896 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993).
32 879 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1989).
33 Id. at 1048.
3 See, e.g., Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490-91 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding
insufficient evidence that principal and school superintendent sued in sexual
assault case had either actual or constructive knowledge of custodian's sexual
contact with students, despite evidence that other school officials had received
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The final topic to be considered is potential areas where the
question of supervisory liability might be confused with other
elements of a plaintiff's Section 1983 case. The first - and this is a
relatively common area of confusion among Circuit courts - is the
relationship between supervisory liability and the state of mind
requirement.
In many Section 1983 cases, plaintiffs, in order to prove a
constitutional violation, must prove that the state official who
violated their rights acted with a particular state of mind." In a
number of cases, the Courts of Appeals have conflated the question
of what state of mind is necessary to establish the particular
constitutional violation with the question of what standard of
liability ought to be imposed on the supervisor.Y For example, a
number of courts have reasoned that because the Supreme Court
has held that negligence is insufficient to make out a due process
violation, negligence cannot be enough in the completely different
context of determining what standard of liability ought to apply to
supervisors in general in Section 1983 cases.
A second area where the courts confuse two different issues
involves the relationship between supervisory liability and
municipal liability. In order to sue a city, the plaintiff must prove
that the constitutional violation was caused by an official policy or

complaints about the custodian and rumors had circulated about him; also
dismissing the plaintiffs' allegation that the superintendent had made a
statement to them admitting that "problems involving [the custodian] had
arisen prior to the attack" on their daughter as only "one nonspecific
statement.").
31 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
36
See, e.g., Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
negligence as the standard for supervisory liability because the Supreme Court
held in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344 (1986), that a due process violation requires a state of mind

more culpable than negligence); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 n. 1 (8th Cir.
1995) (suggesting that the subjective standard of deliberate indifference
adopted by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994),
for Eighth Amendment claims governed the standard of supervisory liability);
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding similarly
to Jojola).
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custom. 37 That "official policy or custom" requirement should not

apply, however, when a plaintiff is suing a supervisor in her
individual capacity. Nevertheless, courts often use that "official
policy or custom" requiremente or some of the other Supreme
Court rulings on municipal liability, 39 and transfer those standards
and requirements over into cases where supervisors have been sued

in theirpersonal capacity.
A recent Eighth Circuit opinion seemed to recognize the
inappropriateness of this line of reasoning. The Eighth Circuit
commented that supervisors need not be policy-makers (one of the
requirements for imposing liability on a city) in order to be held
personally liable for a subordinate's constitutional wrongdoing.,,
The last area of confusion - and this is one of the new, evolving
issues in Section 1983 cases involving supervisors -

is the

relationship between supervisory liability and qualified immunity,
and the extent to which a supervisor can prevail on a qualified
immunity claim. There is not much case law on this question. It is

37 See Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
' See, e.g., Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995); Hill
v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1194 (lth Cir. 1994);
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1387 (4th Cir. 1993).
" A number of courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) - that cities may be held liable
for failing to train the employee who violated the plaintiff's rights only if "the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference" - as requiring proof of
deliberate indifference in order to impose liability on supervisors. See, e.g.,
Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 807 (8th Cir. 1994); Doe v.
Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane); Wilks
v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d
829, 837 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice,
114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying in a supervisory liability case on
the Supreme Court's ruling in Board of County Comm'rs. v. Brown, 117 S.
Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997), that the deliberate indifference necessary to impose
municipal liability is "a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.").
'0 Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 653 (8th
Cir. 1998).
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an issue that is evolving slowly. Nevertheless, several courts have
already taken different positions on this question."
A relatively recent First Circuit opinion contains an extensive
discussion of the intersection between supervisory liability and
qualified immunity.42 According to the First Circuit, a supervisor
is entitled to qualified immunity unless the court is convinced that
there was a clearly established constitutional violation on the part of
the subordinate; that it was clearly established that the supervisor
would be held liable for constitutional violations committed by a
subordinate in that context; and that the supervisor's conduct was
not objectively reasonable. 3
In adopting that three-pa"t standard for qualified immunity, the
First Circuit has imposed a fairly rigorous burden on plaintiffs,
combining some of the approaches that the other courts had
previously taken. The qualified immunity question is one that is
likely to receive further attention from the courts in the future.

4 Some

courts have suggested that a supervisor is entitled to qualified
immunity unless the reasonable public official in her position would have
realized that her own conduct violated the plaintiff's rights. See, e.g., Dolihite
v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054 (11th Cir. 1996); Greason v. Kemp, 891
F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882
F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989).
Other courts have indicated that a supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity
if the standard of supervisory liability was not clearly established. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
bane); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.
1989).
' Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).
43 d. at6.
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